62 On this point, it should
be remembered that it is settled case-law that the principle of
proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community
law, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions should not
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to
attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question, and where
there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be
had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be
disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, in particular, Case C-331/88
Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 13, Case C-180/96 United
Kingdom v Commission, cited above, paragraph 96, and Case C-101/98 UDL
[1999] ECR I-8841, paragraph 30).
63 It is also settled
case-law, with respect to judicial review of the conditions mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, that the Community legislature has wide
legislative powers in the field of the common transport policy as
regards the adoption of appropriate common rules (see, to that effect,
in particular, Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95 SAM Schiffahrt and
Stapf [1997] ECR I-4475, paragraph 23).
64 In reviewing the
exercise of such powers, the Court cannot substitute its own assessment
for that of the Community legislature, but must confine itself to
examining whether that latter assessment contains a manifest error or
constitutes a misuse of powers or whether the authority in question
clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion (see, in particular, SAM
Schiffahrt and Stapf, paragraph 24).
65 Moreover, the Court's
case-law also shows that where, as in this case, implementation by the
Council of a common policy requires it to assess a complex economic
situation, its discretion is exercisable not only in relation to the
nature and scope of the provisions which are to be adopted but also, to
a certain extent, to the findings as to the basic facts, especially in
the sense that it is free to base its assessment, if necessary, on
findings of a general nature (see, in particular, SAM Schiffahrt and
Stapf, paragraph 25).
66 In the present case, the
Council did not exceed its margin of appreciation in taking the view
that the criterion of a by-pass ratio of 3 or more could contribute to
the objective of reducing the damage to the environment caused by air
traffic in terms of noise, fuel burn and gaseous emissions.
67 Nor has Omega shown that
the criterion relating to by-pass ratio was inappropriate.
68 Moreover, its
assertions, which are in any case disputed by the United Kingdom
Government, refer exclusively to a particular type of aeroplane, the
projected re-engined Boeing 707s. These assertions are no more than
forecasts, since those aeroplanes have not yet undergone certification
tests, as the Advocate General has observed in point 76 of his Opinion.
69 The Commission, on the
other hand, has produced general data on the development of noise
pollution and fuel burn of aeroplanes over the three decades from the
1960s to the beginning of the 1990s. Those data show that the gradual
increase in by-pass ratios during that period was accompanied by a
reduction of noise emissions by 20 to 25 EPNdB, which is equivalent to a
four- to five-fold reduction in perceived noise nuisance, and to a
reduction in fuel consumption per passenger on long-haul flights by over
50%, with a consequent reduction in gaseous emissions.
70 Moreover, the Community
legislature has already in the past enacted other legislation based on
the criterion that a higher by-pass ratio is an indication that the
engine is less noisy. A by-pass ratio of 2 is used in Article 4(e) of
Directive 89/629 (see paragraph 24 above) and Article 2(1) of Directive
92/14 (see paragraph 26 above) as an alternative to compliance with the
Chapter 3 noise standards. That alternative is also suggested in
Resolutions A31-11 and A32-8 of the ICAO Assembly recommending the
Member States to introduce a derogation for aeroplanes with engines with
a high by-pass ratio in the event of early application of the Chapter 3
thresholds (see paragraph 19 above).
71 Omega further submits
that alternative measures could have been adopted which would have been
economically less damaging for it, and that aircraft noise can come from
sources other than the engines.
72 On this point, even if
such measures could make a sufficient contribution to reducing
environmental damage caused by air traffic, the Council could reasonably
take into consideration that the application of separate criteria
relating to the reduction of noise, fuel burn and gaseous emissions
would have represented a highly complex operation which was not
justified by the limited number of aeroplanes such as those re-engined
by Omega. In the same way, it could reasonably consider that reference
to a single technical criterion could remove the uncertainties which
specific standards might allow to persist. Thus, for the problem of
noise alone, if the take-off, landing and sideline figures had to be
weighted, the question could also arise whether the differentiated
influence of noise volumes ought not to be taken into account. For those
reasons, the Council did not commit a manifest error of assessment in
its choice of criteria by taking account of the fact that the by-pass
ratio appears more workable because it requires fewer tests and
measurements, both in terms of design and control.
73 In those circumstances,
it does not appear that the Council committed a manifest error of
assessment by considering it necessary to authorise the re-engining of
aeroplanes only using engines with a by-pass ratio of 3 or more.
74 Accordingly, it does not
appear that Article 2(2) of the Regulation infringes the principle of
proportionality.
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